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MATERIAL ADVERSE CHANGE CLAUSES AND ACQUISITION DYNAMICS 
 
Abstract 
Material-Adverse-Change clauses (MACs) are present in over 90% of acquisition agreements.  
These clauses are the outcome of extensive negotiation and exhibit substantial cross-sectional 
variation in the number and types of events that are excluded from being ‘material adverse 
events’ (MAEs).  MAEs are the underlying cause of more than 50% of acquisition terminations 
and 60% of acquisition renegotiations.  Moreover, these renegotiations lead to substantial 
changes in the price offered to target shareholders (13-15%).  We find that acquisitions with 
fewer MAE exclusions are characterized by wider arbitrage spreads (i.e., the difference between 
the price offered to target shareholders and the current market price of the target’s shares) during 
the acquisition period and are associated with higher offer premiums.  We conclude that material 
adverse change clauses have an economically important impact on the dynamics of corporate 
acquisitions and stock prices during the acquisition period. 2 
 
1. Introduction 
A large prior literature documents that acquisitions significantly impact the wealth of both 
target and acquiring firm shareholders.
1  At the time of the initial announcement, however, the 
ultimate impact on shareholder wealth is uncertain.  Because of the relatively long period 
between the announcement and the completion of the acquisition (4.5 months, on average in our 
sample), the probability of adverse events that can alter the expected wealth gains from the 
acquisition is nontrivial.  As a result, terminated and renegotiated acquisitions are not 
uncommon.  Merger agreements thus often contain contractual mechanisms that allocate the 
risks between the target and acquirer over the time period between the first announcement and 
the completion of the acquisition. 
We analyze the impact of one such mechanism, Material-Adverse-Change clauses (MACs), 
on the dynamics of corporate acquisitions.   A MAC clause functions as an abandonment option 
in that it gives either party the right to walk away from the acquisition, without penalty, if a 
material adverse event (MAE) occurs between the announcement and the completion of the 
acquisition.  Examples of MAEs are economic or industry shocks, financial misreporting, or 
regulatory changes.  The strength of this abandonment option can be limited, however, by 
specifying particular events (or classes of events) that are excluded from being material adverse 
events.   
                                                            
1 See, among others, Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001), Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001), and Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) 
.  3 
 
Our sample consists of 844 acquisitions announced between 1998 and 2005.  Over 90% of 
the sample acquisitions employ a MAC clause.  This makes MACs far more common than other 
contractual mechanisms for allocating risk between target and acquiring firm shareholders such 
as termination fees, lockup options, collars, and earnouts.
2  Despite this uniformity in use, 
however, we observe substantial cross-sectional variation in the number and type of MAE 
exclusions.  On average, MACs contain nearly four MAE exclusions ranging from fairly general, 
market wide events (i.e. ‘Global economic conditions’) to firm-specific events (i.e. ‘Failure to 
meet projections’), and over two-thirds of the sample MACs contain at least one MAE exclusion.   
Our analysis indicates that MAEs are common and have a large impact on the dynamics of 
the acquisition process.  Over 10% of the sample acquisitions experience a MAE between the 
initial announcement of the acquisition and the completion of the acquisition period.  MAEs are 
the underlying cause for over half of the terminated acquisitions and nearly 60% of the 
renegotiated acquisitions.  Moreover, the material adverse events ultimately lead to large changes 
in the price offered to target shareholders.  On average, acquirers negotiate a 15% reduction in 
offer price when the target experiences a MAE.  Similarly, targets are able to negotiate a 13% 
increase in the offer price when the acquirer experiences a MAE.  Finally, acquisitions that are 
renegotiated following a MAE have a 25% higher probability of completion than do acquisitions 
that are renegotiated for other reasons.   
We also find that the structure of MAC clauses is associated with acquisition outcomes.  
Specifically, we find that the probability of an acquisition being completed is positively related 
                                                            
2 See Coates and Subramanian (2000), Burch (2001), Houston and Ryngaert (1997), Officer (2004), Bates and 
Lemmon (2003), Officer (2003), Cain, Denis and Denis (2009), and Boone and Mulherin (2007a).  
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to the number of MAE exclusions.  Ceteris paribus, a one-standard-deviation increase in the 
number of MAE exclusions is associated with an increase of 3% in the probability of acquisition 
completion (relative to an unconditional probability of 87%).  By contrast, the probability of an 
acquisition being renegotiated is negatively related to the number of MAE exclusions.   
Increasing the number of MAE exclusions by one is associated with a decrease in the probability 
of renegotiation of 2% (ceteris paribus) relative to the unconditional probability of renegotiation 
of 11%.  These results are robust to controls for other potential determinants of acquisition 
outcomes and controls for potential self-selection bias. 
Having established the association between MACs and acquisition dynamics, we then test 
whether the apparent impact of MACs on these dynamics is ‘priced’ by investors and by the 
parties to the acquisition.  First, we analyze arbitrage spreads - i.e., the difference between the 
price offered to target shareholders and the current market price of the target’s shares.  Previous 
studies (i.e., Brown and Raymond (1986); Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2004)) use arbitrage 
spreads as a proxy for the expected probability of acquisition completion.  Thus, if MACs with 
more MAE exclusions decrease the likelihood of termination, we expect a negative association 
between the number of MAE exclusions and arbitrage spreads.  Consistent with this view, we 
find that acquisitions with an above-median number of MAE exclusions exhibit median arbitrage 
spreads of 5.2% on the day following the announcement of the acquisition.  This spread is 
significantly lower (at the 0.01 level) than the median spread of 8.5% for acquisitions with a 
below-median number of MAE exclusions.  These findings are robust to controls for other 
determinants of the arbitrage spread and persist over the 20-day period following the initial 
announcement of the acquisition.  Thus, we conclude that the structure of MACs represents an 5 
 
important channel through which information about the likelihood of acquisition completion is 
incorporated into market prices. 
Second, we analyze the association between MAC structure and the premium offered by the 
acquiring firm.  We hypothesize that acquirers with a stronger abandonment option (i.e. fewer 
MAE exclusions) will be willing to offer a higher ex ante premium for the target firm.   
Consistent with this prediction, we find a significant negative relation between the acquisition 
premium and the number of MAE exclusions.  A one standard deviation increase in the number 
of exclusions decreases the predicted offer premium from a baseline value of 43% to 40%.  We 
note, however, that the structure of the MAC clause and the offer premium are jointly negotiated 
as part of the acquisition agreement.  Thus, it is possible that both are affected by some 
unobserved factor.  Although we cannot completely rule out this possibility, we conduct a battery 
of additional tests and find that the basic negative association between offer premium and MAE 
exclusions is robust.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides background 
information material adverse change clauses and the acquisition process.  Section 3 describes our 
sample selection process and presents descriptive statistics for the sample acquisitions.  Section 4 
reports our evidence on the impact of MAC clauses on acquisition dynamics.  Section 5 analyzes 
the impact of MACs on arbitrage spreads and offer premiums.  Section 6 concludes. 
2.   Background on Material-Adverse-Change Clauses 
Figure 1 presents a schematic that divides the acquisition process into separate pre-
announcement and post-announcement sub-periods.  Prior to the announcement, the parties to the 6 
 
acquisition initially engage in due diligence activities, and then begin the process of drafting the 
merger agreement.  During this period, the parties negotiate an offer price and any contractual 
mechanisms (e.g. MAC clauses, earnouts, collars, termination fees, lockups) that will affect the 
ex post payoffs to the parties.  Between the initial announcement of the merger agreement and 
completion (or termination) of the merger (a period of 4.5 months, on average, in our sample), a 
variety of events can occur that potentially alter the wealth gains to each party from the 
acquisition.  During this period, merger terms can be renegotiated and the merger is either 
completed or terminated. 
Material-Adverse-Change (MAC) clauses in the merger agreement define the conditions 
under which each party can ‘walk away’ from the merger (without penalty) in the event of a 
Material-Adverse-Event (MAE).  MAEs can be of a market-wide or a firm-specific nature.     
Typical market-wide MAEs are changes in economic, market, industry, or regulatory conditions.  
Typical firm-specific MAEs are the loss of key customers, employees, inventory; the accidental 
death of the CEO; or drastic changes in the stock price or volume.  As such, firm-specific MAEs 
can be either exogenous (e.g., the accidental death of the CEO) or endogenous (e.g., earnings 
restatements or the loss of a large customer due to lack of effort after the announcement of the 
acquisition). 
Although MACs can provide either the target or the acquirer with the right to terminate the 
acquisition, our discussions with practitioners indicate that MACs are primarily geared towards 
providing walk-away rights to acquiring firms.  The strength of this right is determined primarily 
by the number of events that are excluded from being considered material adverse events.  Target 
firms negotiate these ‘MAE exclusions’ as a means of constraining the acquirer’s ability to 7 
 
terminate the transaction.  That is, if an excluded MAE occurs, the acquirer cannot walk away 
from the original merger agreement.  In this sense, the acquirer’s abandonment option is 
weakened as more MAE’s are excluded.
3   
Legal practitioners claim that MACs are highly negotiated elements of merger agreements.
4  
Moreover, recent anecdotal evidence of acquisitions that have been terminated following alleged 
material adverse events implies that MACs have had an important impact on acquisition 
dynamics in these cases.
5  Nonetheless, we are not aware of any systematic evidence of the 
economic impact of MACs on acquisitions.  Prior academic studies of MACs have been limited 
to descriptions of MAC structure, with emphasis on legal issues [Davidoff and Baiardi (2008)], 
their evolution through time [Gilson and Schwartz (2005)] and their cross-sectional variation 
[Macias (2008)].  We complement and extend this literature by analyzing how (if at all) MACs 
affect the dynamics of the acquisition process.  Specifically, we first provide detailed evidence 
on the structure of MACs, the frequency of material adverse events, the link between material 
adverse events and acquisition outcomes, and the association between MAC structure and 
acquisition outcomes.  We then test whether the impact of MACs on acquisition dynamics is 
priced by analyzing arbitrage spreads and offer premiums.   
                                                            
3 Appendix I provides excerpts from the merger agreement between Arrow Electronics and Richey Electronics (filed 
with the SEC on 12/04/1998) to illustrate how the target and acquirer define the MAC and the MAE exclusions.   
4 See, for example, Klein and Cooper (2007); Alexander (2005); and Adams (2004).   
5 See:  The Economist (Sep2001, Dec2001, Nov2005), Knowledge@Wharton (2006), Skadden’s Wolff and Moore 
(2007), among several other articles in the Wall Street Journal and New York Times 8 
 
3.   Sample Selection and Data Description 
Our sample begins with the universe of 2,045 acquisitions (both completed and terminated) 
of public targets in the United States (U.S.) announced by U.S. public acquirers between 1998 
and 2005 and reported in the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions 
database.  We require the market value of the target’s equity to be at least 1% of the acquirer’s 
value and that the sample firms are covered on the CRSP and Compustat databases.  In addition, 
to document the structure of MACs, we require that the relevant SEC filings (i.e., 8k, 425, S4, 
PREM14, DEF14A or SC 13D files) exist for the acquisition.  Because these filings are required 
only for those acquisitions in which the acquirer seeks at least 50% ownership of the target’s 
shares, this requirement limits our sample to acquisitions in which the acquirer seeks majority 
ownership of the target.  After imposing these requirements, our final sample consists of 844 
announced acquisitions.   
Panel A of Table 1 reports a time profile of the sample and the frequency of MACs.  Of the 
844 acquisitions, 771 (91.4%) contain a material adverse change clause.  This frequency 
increases slightly over time from a low of 88.6% in 1999 to a high of 95.9% in 2004.  To put this 
frequency in perspective, we note that prior studies of other contractual mechanisms in 
acquisitions report much lower frequencies.  For example, Officer (2003, 2004) reports 
frequencies of 42% and 18% for termination fees and collars, respectively.  Boone and Mulherin 
(2007) report that 29% of their sample acquisitions have a lockup option, while Cain, Denis, and 
Denis (2010) report that only 4% of completed acquisitions on SDC have an earnout provision.  
We conclude, therefore, that MACs are the most pervasive among the set of contractual 
mechanisms that allocate risks between the target and acquiring firm shareholders. 9 
 
Panel A also reports data on the number of material adverse event (MAE) exclusions.  On 
average, the sample MACs contain nearly four exclusions and more than two-thirds of the 
sample MACs contain at least one exclusion.  There is also substantial variation in the number 
and type of exclusions across acquisitions.  We categorize MAE exclusions based on the 
definitions of MAEs contained in the merger agreements.
6    As shown in Panel B of Table 1, the 
most frequent exclusions are for general economic conditions (54%), industry conditions (51%), 
and changes in firm prospects due to an agreement or a transaction announcement (50%).   
Finally, the data in Table 1 indicates that the average number of exclusions has increased 
significantly over the sample period from 2.4 in 1998 to 6.5 in 2005.   
In Table 2 we present descriptive statistics for characteristics of the sample acquisitions.  
Targets are approximately one-third the size of the acquirer, on average.  Approximately 11% of 
the acquisitions are either ‘unsolicited’ or ‘hostile’ or ‘unsolicited,’ as defined in SDC, SEC 
filings, or on Factiva, and 21% are tender offers.  The main industry of the acquirer and target 
differs in almost 22% of the acquisitions.  The consideration paid in the acquisition is exclusively 
cash in 31% of the acquisitions, exclusively stock in 48% of the acquisitions, and a mix of cash 
and stock in the remainder.  On average, cash comprises 40% of the total consideration paid.  
These characteristics are similar to those in other studies of acquisitions over a similar time 
period.
7   
Table 2 also compares acquisition characteristics for firms with an above-median and a 
below-median number of MAE exclusions.  These data indicate that in acquisitions with a 
                                                            
6 See the American Bar Association (2006) study and the Nixon-Peabody (2007) survey for more detailed 
explanations of the categories of MAE exclusions.  
7 See, for example, Boone and Mulherin (2007b), Officer (2003), and Fuller (2003). 10 
 
below-median number of exclusions, the target is larger relative to the acquirer, the acquisition is 
more likely to be hostile, to be a tender offer, and to involve a target operating in a different 
primary industry.  In addition, the proportion of payment in cash tends to be higher.  We later 
control for these systematic differences in our tests of the association between MAC structure 
and acquisition dynamics.    
 
4.   MACs and Acquisition Dynamics 
  In this section, we analyze how, if at all, MACs affect the dynamics of the acquisition 
process.  Because MACs give the acquirer the right to abandon the acquisition in the presence of 
a material adverse event, they can also provide a greater incentive to the acquisition parties to 
renegotiate the terms of the acquisition in a way that reflects the revised market conditions.  We 
first document the extent to which acquisition dynamics are affected by material adverse events, 
and then analyze the association between the structure of MACs and acquisition outcomes. 
Panel A of Table 3 provides a frequency distribution of acquisition outcomes.  Of the 844 
sample acquisitions, 737 (87.3%) are completed and 107 (12.7%) are terminated.  In 92 (10.9%) 
acquisitions, the terms of the acquisition are renegotiated following the initial merger agreement.  
Of these, 65 are eventually completed under revised terms and 27 are ultimately terminated.   
In Panel B, we analyze the link between material adverse events and acquisition outcomes.  
For each acquisition that is either terminated or that reports a change in any of the negotiated 
terms of the deal, we examine each proxy statement filed between the initial announcement of 
the acquisition and the outcome of the acquisition contest.  We then identify the stated reasons 11 
 
for the termination or renegotiation from the proxy statements and confirm this information in 
news reports on Factiva.  We find that MAEs occur in 89 (10.5%) of the sample acquisitions.  Of 
the 92 sample acquisitions that are renegotiated, 50 are renegotiated as a direct result of a 
material adverse event.  Similarly, of the 107 acquisitions that are terminated, 50 are terminated 
as a direct result of a MAE, while another 11 are terminated following a renegotiation of deal 
terms that was initiated by a MAE.  Thus, material adverse events are the underlying cause of 
over half of the terminated acquisitions in the sample and nearly 60% of the renegotiated 
acquisitions.
8   
Finally, Panel C of Table 3 shows that the occurrence of a material adverse event results in 
an economically large revision in the terms of the acquisition.  We classify MAEs into those that 
refer to market-wide events and those that refer to firm-specific events.  Additionally, we specify 
whether the MAE is experienced by the target or by the acquirer – i.e., whether the event 
primarily reduced the value of the target or the acquiring company.  As shown in Panel C, 
conditional on an acquisition being renegotiated in response to a material adverse event, the offer 
price is revised by 12.3%, on average.  (This value is obtained by computing the weighted 
average of the absolute values if the price changes in Panel C.)  The largest change is associated 
with firm-specific material adverse events experienced by targets; these events are associated 
with a 15% reduction in the offer price, on average.  Similarly, firm-specific material adverse 
events experienced by the acquiring firm are associated with an average change in the offer price 
                                                            
8 If anything, we expect this process to understate the link between material adverse events and 
termination/renegotiation decisions since public documents will not necessarily draw a direct link between the 
material adverse change clause and the termination/renegotiation decision. 12 
 
of 13%.  We conclude, therefore, that material adverse events are relatively common and have a 
large impact on acquisition dynamics through the MAC clause.  
We further examine whether cross-sectional variation in the structure of MACs is associated 
with variation in acquisition outcomes.  If a greater number of MAE exclusions weakens the 
acquirer’s option to abandon the acquisition, we expect the number of MAE exclusions to be 
positively associated with the probability that the acquisition is completed.  Moreover, to the 
extent that a stronger abandonment option provides acquiring firm managers with greater 
leverage to renegotiate the terms of the acquisition following a MAE, we expect a negative 
association between the probability of renegotiation and the number of MAE exclusions. 
To test these predictions, we estimate separate logit models in which the dependent variable 
is equal to one if the acquisition is completed (renegotiated) and zero otherwise.  The models 
control for other acquisition characteristics as well as characteristics of the target and acquiring 
firm.  We report standardized odds ratio coefficients as well as the marginal effects for each 
variable.  The results are reported in Table 4 and depicted in Figures 2 and 3.  Consistent with 
our prediction, the first two columns of Table 4 indicate that the likelihood that an acquisition is 
completed is positively associated with the number of MAE exclusions.  A one-standard 
deviation change in the number of MAE exclusions results in a 3% change in the probability of 
completion.  This compares with an unconditional probability of completion of 87%. The 
likelihood of completion is also positively related to whether the terms of the acquisition are 
renegotiated, the size of the premium offered, and the size of the acquirer.  Consistent with Bates 
and Lemmon (2003) and Officer (2004), the likelihood of completion is negatively related to 13 
 
whether the acquisition is hostile, whether the contest contains multiple bidders, and the size of 
the target firm.   
Similarly, columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 show that the likelihood of renegotiation is 
negatively associated with the number of MAE exclusions.  As also depicted in Figure 3, a one-
standard deviation increase in the number of MAE exclusions reduces the probability of 
renegotiation by 3%, as compared with the unconditional probability of 11%.  The likelihood of 
renegotiation is also positively related to the hostility of the acquisition bid, the presence of 
multiple bidders, and the riskiness of the target (as measured by the standard deviation of target 
returns.)  In untabulated results, we find similar results using a duration analysis of the time to 
completion or renegotiation rather than simple logit specifications.   
Of course, these associations may simply reflect self-selection and/or simultaneity biases.  
For example, acquirers of targets with a lower ex ante probability of completion and higher 
probability of renegotiation might negotiate fewer MAE exclusions.  To address these potential 
biases, we estimate both two-stage treatment effects models and three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
models that control for self-selection and simultaneity effects.  These results (available upon 
request) indicate that the negative association between the probability of completion and the 
number of MAE exclusions and the positive association between the likelihood of renegotiation 
and the number of MAE exclusions are robust to these endogeneity controls.  We conclude, 




5.   The Impact of MACs on Arbitrage Spreads and Offer Premiums 
  In this section, we analyze whether the impact of MACs on acquisition dynamics is 
‘priced’ by investors and by the parties to the acquisition.  Specifically, we first analyze arbitrage 
spreads as a measure of the market’s assessment of the likelihood of acquisition completion.  
Second, we analyze the initial premiums offered by acquirers for evidence that having fewer 
MAE exclusions is associated with acquirers offering higher premiums. 
5.1. Arbitrage Spreads 
  Following the announcement of an acquisition, the target company’s shares typically 
trade at a discount to the price that is being offered by the acquiring company.  This difference 
between the market price and the offer price is known as the arbitrage spread.  Prior studies by 
Brown and Raymond (1986) and Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) report evidence consistent with the 
view that arbitrage spreads capture the probability that the acquisition will be completed.  That 
is, arbitrage spreads are much wider for acquisitions that are ultimately abandoned than for those 
that are ultimately completed. 
  If the structure of MACs affects the dynamics of acquisition outcomes, this should be 
reflected in the arbitrage spread.  Specifically, if a greater number of MAE exclusions constrains 
the acquirer’s ability to walk away from the proposed acquisition, we expect a negative 
relationship between the arbitrage spread and the number of MAE exclusions.  To explore this 
hypothesis, we calculate arbitrage spreads over Days 1 through 20 relative to the initial 
announcement of the acquisition.  On each day, we calculate the arbitrage spread as the 
difference between the stated offer price and the current market price of the target, scaled by the 15 
 
current market price.  As indicated in Panel A of Table 5, median arbitrage spreads are 6.2% on 
the day after initial announcement and 4.2% on Day 20 relative to the initial announcement.  
These spreads are significantly higher for acquisitions that have a below-median number of 
MAE exclusions than for those with an above-median number of MAE exclusions.  On Day 1 
(Day 20), median arbitrage spreads are 8.5% (7.4%) for acquisitions with a below-median 
number of exclusions and 5.2% (3.1%) for acquisitions with an above-median number of 
exclusions.  The paired differences are statistically significant at the 0.01 level using a medians 
test.   
  We provide further evidence on this issue by estimating cross-sectional regressions of 
arbitrage spreads at Day 1 and Day 20 on the number of MAE exclusions and other potential 
determinants of the arbitrage spread such as the existence of a termination fee, the form of 
payment, whether the acquisition was in response to another bid, the size of the target, the 
relative size of the target, whether the acquisition was hostile, and whether there were multiple 
bidders.  The results, reported in columns (1) and (4) of Panel B of Table 5 indicate that arbitrage 
spreads are negatively associated with the number of MAE exclusions.  The coefficient on the 
number of exclusions is significant at the 0.10 level on day 1, but not statistically significant at 
conventional levels on day 20 (p-value = 0.12).  Apart from the relative size of the acquisition, 
none of the other independent variables are statistically significant. 
Although the negative association between arbitrage spreads and the number of MAE 
exclusions is consistent with the view that fewer MAE exclusions decreases the probability of 
deal completion, it is possible that arbitrage spreads and the number of exclusions are both 
driven by the same underlying (but unobserved) phenomenon.  For example, perhaps target and 16 
 
acquiring firms choose to have fewer MAE exclusions in acquisitions that have a higher risk of 
failure.  Arbitrageurs may then react to this same perceived risk by setting higher spreads.   
To address this issue, we note that arbitrageurs can only assess the impact of different MAC 
structures on the likelihood of acquisition completion if they have access to the details of the 
MAC structure in the merger agreement.  In our sample, more than 50% of the merger 
agreements are filed with the SEC more than five days after the initial announcement of the 
acquisition.  Thus, if the negative association between arbitrage spreads and the number of MAE 
exclusions is due to arbitrageurs inferring information about the likelihood of acquisitions 
completion from the structure of the MAC, we expect to observe the negative association only in 
those transactions in which the merger agreement has been filed by the date on which the 
arbitrage spreads are measured.  By contrast, if arbitrage spreads and number of MAE exclusions 
are both driven by an unobserved factor, we do not expect the date on which the merger 
agreement is filed to affect the negative association between spreads and the number of 
exclusions. 
As shown in Models (2) and (3), as of Day 1 following the initial acquisition announcement, 
the merger agreement has been filed in only 343 of the 811 acquisitions with available data.  For 
these 343, there is a strong negative association between arbitrage spreads and the number of 
MAE exclusions.  The coefficient on MAE exclusions implies that adding each MAE exclusion 
reduces the predicted arbitrage spread by 0.9%.  This effect is economically large relative to the 
unconditional median arbitrage spread of 6.2% on Day 1.  By contrast, for the 468 acquisitions in 
which the merger agreement has not yet been filed as of Day 1, there is no association between 
arbitrage spreads and the number of MAE exclusions. 17 
 
We find similar results at Day 20 after the initial announcement (Models (5) and (6)).  As of 
Day 20, 667 of the 811 merger agreements have been filed.  For these targets, there is a 
significant association between the arbitrage spread on that day and the number of MAE 
exclusions in the MAC clause of the merger agreement.  Again the effect is economically 
important; the addition of each MAE exclusion is associated with a reduction in the arbitrage 
spread of 1.5%.  This compares with an unconditional median arbitrage spread of 4.2% on Day 
20.  For the remaining 144 cases in which the merger agreement has not been filed, there is no 
association between arbitrage spreads and the number of MAE exclusions. 
These findings are robust to alternative definitions of the MAE exclusions variable, to 
alternative estimation techniques, and to various controls for outliers.  Specifically, rather than 
simply counting the number of MAE exclusions, we also estimate the models in Table 5 using a 
binary variable equal to one if the acquisition has at least one MAE exclusion and a binary 
variable equal to one if the acquisition has an above-median number of MAE exclusions.  We 
also estimate the models as part of a three-stage least squares (3SLS) in which we use the 
predicted number of MAE exclusions as an instrument for the actual number of exclusions.  
Finally, we winsorize all variables at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles and use bootstrapped standard 
errors.  Although, for the sake of brevity, we do not report these robustness tests in a table, our 
qualitative conclusions are unchanged.  Arbitrage spreads are negatively associated with the 
number of MAE exclusions in the MAC structure.   
Taken together, these findings are consistent with the joint hypothesis that (i) the structure of 
MACs materially affects the likelihood of acquisition completion, and (ii) this likelihood is 
reflected in market prices when publicly disclosed.  More generally our findings imply that the 18 
 
structure of MACs represents one channel through which information about the likelihood of 
acquisition completion is embedded in stock prices.   
 
5.2. Offer Premiums 
  At the time of an acquisition, the target and acquiring firms negotiate both the premium 
to be offered to the target and the structure of the MAC clause.  Thus, if the structure of MACs 
influences the subsequent dynamics of the acquisition, it is plausible that the parties to the 
acquisition trade off the offer premium with the number of MAE exclusions.  Specifically, if a 
greater number of MAE exclusions limits the acquirer’s ability to ‘walk away’ from the 
acquisition, we hypothesize that, all else equal, the acquirer will offer a lower premium in such 
cases.  Thus, we expect a negative association between offer premiums and the number of MAE 
exclusions.   
  To explore this hypothesis, we first estimate the offer premium by comparing the 
reported offer price with the target’s share price four weeks prior to the initial public 
announcement of the acquisition.  We verify consistency of the data across the various data 
sources that we use in the study.  In those cases in which we have data from multiple sources, but 
for which there is a discrepancy, we use the following order of priority: (i) SEC filings, (ii) 
LivEdgar M&A database, (iii) SDC’s M&A database.   
  We find that, on average, acquiring firms offer a price for the target that is 43% above the 
target’s price four weeks earlier.  This premium is larger for firms with a below-median number 
of MAE exclusions (average = 47%) than those with an above-median number of exclusions 19 
 
(average = 41%).  The difference is statistically significant at the 0.01 level using either a t-test 
for means or a medians test.  (These data are not reported in a table).   
  In Table 6, we estimate cross-sectional regressions of the offer premium (expressed as a 
percentage) on the number of MAE exclusions and a series of control variables.  Prior studies 
[e.g. Bates and Lemmon (2003), Officer (2003), and Boone and Mulherin (2008)] find that offer 
premiums are associated with the size of the target and acquiring firms, the Tobin’s Q of the 
target, the method of payment, whether or not the acquisition bid is hostile or unsolicited, the 
existence of a prior bid for the target, and whether or not the acquisition includes a termination 
fee.  To facilitate comparison with the prior literature, we first present ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions in Columns (1) and (2).  Statistical significance is measured using Eicker-
Huber-White-Sandwich heteroskedastic-robust standard errors clustered by target industry.   
  Consistent with prior studies, the results in Column (1) indicate that offer premiums are 
positively related to the size of the acquiring firm and negatively related to the size of the target 
firm.  Controlling for these firm characteristics, we find that offer premiums are significantly 
negatively related to the number of MAE exclusions contained in the MAC clause.  The 
coefficient on number of MAE exclusions is significant at the 0.005 level and indicates that, at 
the margin, each additional MAE exclusion is associated with a reduction of 1 percentage point 
in the offer premium.  We find similar results in Column (2) when we add additional variables 
that control for characteristics of the acquisition (e.g. method of payment, whether the bid was 
hostile or unsolicited, existence of a prior bid, and whether or not there is a termination fee).
9   
                                                            
9 The results are also robust to winsorizing all variables at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles as well as at the 5
th and 95
th 
percentiles.   20 
 
  Although the results in Columns (1) and (2) imply a statistical association between MAC 
structure and offer premiums, it is difficult to interpret this association as causal since the 
number of MAE exclusions and the premium are both negotiated as part of the merger 
agreement.  That is, they are jointly determined.  To address this issue, we estimate a 
simultaneous equations system with the number of MAE exclusions and the offer premium 
treated as the two endogenous variables.  To ensure that the system is identified, we include 
several variables in each equation that are not included in the other equation.   Specifically, we 
exclude from the MAE exclusions equation the standard deviation of target returns over the prior 
year, a dummy variable denoting whether there was a prior bid for the target, and the dummy 
variable denoting whether there was termination fee by the target.  In unreported correlation 
analysis, we find that these variables are correlated with the offer premium, but not with the 
number of MAE exclusions.  Similarly, from the offer premium regression, we exclude the log of 
the number of days of due diligence by the acquirer and whether the target and the acquirer are 
from different industries.  We also find in unreported analysis that these variables are correlated 
with the number of MAE exclusions, but not with the offer premium.  In addition, we conduct a 
battery of specification tests that support the validity of our instruments.  (These tests are not 
reported in the paper, but are available from the authors upon request.) 
  The results of the simultaneous equations estimation are reported in Columns (3) and (4) 
of Table 6.  These findings indicate that the negative association between the offer premium and 
the number of MAE exclusions is driven primarily by greater MAE exclusions leading to lower 21 
 
offer premiums.
10  This finding is consistent with the interpretation that target shareholders are 
able to obtain a higher premium in acquisitions for which the MAC structure contains fewer 
exclusions.  Nonetheless, we acknowledge that establishing this relation as causal is difficult 
even with the simultaneous equations models that we employ.  It is possible, for example, that 
there is still some unknown omitted factor that is affecting both the premium and the contractual 
features of the MAC.  Having said that, the fact that our prior findings indicate a causal relation 
between MAEs and acquisition outcomes suggests that it is plausible that the association 
between MAE exclusions and offer premiums is also causal.  That is, if material adverse events 
lead to economically meaningful differences in acquisition outcomes, it seems likely that targets 
can extract higher premiums from acquirers when the acquirer holds a stronger abandonment 
option through the MAC clause.  Conversely, targets might be willing to accept a lower premium 
if a greater number of MAE exclusions increases the probability of completion.  
 
6.   Conclusions 
  Material adverse change clauses are a ubiquitous and intensely negotiated feature of 
merger agreements.  Our analysis shows that MAEs are the underlying cause for the majority of 
acquisition terminations and renegotiations.  These renegotiations result in economically large 
changes in merger premiums.  Moreover, cross-sectional differences in MAC structure are 
associated with differences in acquisition outcomes.  Specifically, MACs with a greater number 
of exclusions are associated with fewer terminations and fewer renegotiations.  We conclude, 
                                                            
10 These results are robust to the inclusion of other contractual mechanisms (i.e., termination fees by the acquirer, 
collars, and lockup options) and year effect dummy variables based on the announcement date of the acquisition. 22 
 
therefore, that MACs have an economically important impact on the dynamics of the acquisition 
process. 
  This impact on acquisition dynamics is reflected in target share prices.  Arbitrage spreads 
are significantly larger in acquisitions for which the MAC clause contains fewer MAE 
exclusions – i.e., those that contain a stronger abandonment option for the acquiring firm.  In this 
sense, our findings contribute to the prior literature on arbitrage spreads in that they provide 
evidence of one important channel through which information about the likelihood of acquisition 
completion is embedded in market prices.   
  Finally, we report evidence that target firms receive higher offer premiums when the 
MAC structure contains fewer MAE exclusions.  Although it is difficult to establish causation 
due to the fact that MAE exclusions and offer premiums are jointly negotiated, this finding is 
consistent with the view that acquirers are willing to offer a higher ex ante premium when they 
have a stronger option to abandon the acquisition ex post.   
  Our findings add to a growing body of literature that analyzes contractual features of 
merger agreements.  These features include lockup provisions, termination fees, collars, and 
earnouts.
11  To some degree, these features all allocate risks between the target and acquiring 
firms during and following the acquisition period.  Our study shows that MAC clauses are the 
most common among these contractual mechanisms , they are highly customized, and they have 
a substantial impact on acquisition dynamics.  An important extension to our study would be an 
analysis of the determinants of MAC structure.  Although most of our tests require only that the 
                                                            
11 See the studies referenced in footnote #2.   23 
 
structure of MACs is predetermined, it is noteworthy that there is considerable cross-sectional 
variation in the number of MAE exclusions contained in the sample agreements.  Because our 
understanding of the determinants of this variation is limited, we are unable to say whether this 
variation reflects differences in negotiating power between targets and acquirers or whether this 
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Appendix I. Example of MACs Structure and Negotiation in Merger Agreements. 
Richey Electronics (the Target) filed this DEF14A on 12/04/98 
Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of September 30, 1998, by and among Arrow Electronics, Inc., a 
New York corporation ("Arrow"), Lear Acquisition Corp., a Delaware corporation ("Acquisition Corp.") 
and Richey Electronics 
 
A1.1. Conditions to Completion of the Merger   
A1.2  Definition of Material-Adverse-Effect  (MAE exclusions) 
A1.3  Extracts of Negotiation paths: MACs vs. Price (Background of the merger) 
 
A1.1  Conditions to Completion of the Merger   
 
The obligations of Parent and Sub to effect the Merger are subject to the satisfaction of the following 
conditions, unless waived by Parent and Sub: 
  
        (a) REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES; PERFORMANCE OF OBLIGATIONS.  Except 
as otherwise contemplated or permitted by this Agreement,  
(i) the representations and warranties of the Company contained in this Agreement or in any certificate or 
document delivered to Parent pursuant hereto shall as of the Closing Date, (x) to the extent qualified by 
Company Material Adverse Effect, be true in all respects  
… 
   (e) MATERIAL ADVERSE CHANGE.  Since the date hereof, there shall not have been any events, 
changes or occurrences which have had, or are reasonably likely to have, individually or in the aggregate, 
a Company Material Adverse Effect. 
 
 
A1.2  Definition of Material-Adverse-Effect  (2 MAE exclusions)
12 
 
For the purposes of this Agreement, "Company Material Adverse Effect" shall mean a Material 
Adverse Effect on the financial condition, assets, liabilities (contingent or otherwise), results of 
operation, business or business prospects of the Company and its Subsidiaries, if any, taken as a whole. 
For purposes of this Agreement, a Company Material Adverse Effect shall not include a Material 
Adverse Effect on the financial condition, assets, liabilities (contingent or otherwise), results of 
operation, business or business prospects of the Company as a result of  
 
(i)  [1-Economic changes]: changes in the conditions or prospects of the Company and its 
Subsidiaries taken as a whole which are consistent with general economic conditions or  
 
(ii)  [ 2- Industry changes]: general changes affecting the electronic component distribution 
or electronics assembly industries,  
  
                                                            
12 In brackets and italics I show the classification used to count the number of MAE exclusions recorded for this 
example. 28 
 
A1.3  Extracts of Negotiation: MACs vs. Price (Background of the merger) 
On December 25, 1997, … Mr. Rosenbaum and Mr. Warnock discussed business conditions in the 
electronics distribution industry and the continuing trend toward consolidation among distributors.  
… 
On September 11, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP ("Milbank"), Arrow's outside counsel, 
distributed a draft purchase agreement to the parties. After consultation with Mr. Rosenbaum and Mr. 
Blumenthal, Dewey Ballantine marked up the Milbank draft and returned it to Milbank on September 15. 
During the next several days, Mr. Rosenbaum expressed to Mr. Klatell certain reservations Richey had 
concerning the Milbank draft, particularly those provisions related to a post-closing purchase price 
adjustment based upon a physical inventory and the proposed definition of a Material Adverse Change 
and related closing conditions.  
Mr. Rosenbaum urged Mr. Klatell to take whatever time was needed to complete due diligence and then 
sign an agreement, rather than ask Richey to sign such an open ended document as had been proposed. 
… 
On September 22, representatives of Richey and Arrow met at the offices of  Milbank in New York. 
When Richey representatives again stated their concerns regarding a potential purchase price adjustment 
and the definition of Material Adverse Effect as it related to closing conditions, Mr. Klatell agreed to 
have Ms. Morris meet with Mr. Berger later in the week to resolve all outstanding due diligence issues. ... 
Mr. Blumenthal, Mr. Rosenbaum and Mr. Klatell then agreed upon a framework for addressing the 
Material Adverse Change issue in the agreement. 
… 
    On September 28, Mr. Klatell and Mr. Rosenbaum spoke by telephone several times in an attempt to 
reach agreement on the transaction. As a result, Arrow agreed to pay $10.50 in cash per share of Richey 
Common Stock and also agreed in concept to a definition of Material Adverse Change that would allow 
Arrow not to close the transaction. Throughout the day of September 29, revised drafts of the agreement 
were negotiated and exchanged. 
     Late in the day on September 29, Mr. Cacciatore convened a special meeting of Richey's Board of 
Directors via telephone conference. Also participating in the meeting were Mr. Berger, representatives of 
Jefferies, Dewey Ballantine and McGladrey & Pullen LLP. Mr. Rosenbaum reported to Richey's Board of 
Directors that, since the last meeting of September 25, three issues had been isolated with respect to 
the Arrow transaction: arriving at a final price, a fair definition of what constitutes a Material 
Adverse Change and agreeing upon a fee which would be paid to Arrow in the event another bidder 
emerged for Richey and Richey's Board of Directors agreed to accept such other bid. Mr. 
Rosenbaum informed Richey's Board of Directors that a price of $10.50 per share had been agreed to, 
Richey's definition of Material Adverse Change had been accepted, and a breakup fee of $5.5 million 
plus $1.5 million for expenses had been set. 
     Representatives from Jefferies then presented to Richey's Board of Directors an analysis that 
concluded that the price of $10.50 per share in cash was fair, from a financial point of view, to Richey's 
Stockholders. Richey's Board of Directors … passed a formal resolution authorizing the execution of the 
definitive purchase agreement with Arrow,  …. Final adjustments were made to the documents during 
the day of September 30 and the merger agreement was executed after sundown on that day.  
   29 
 
Appendix II. Definitions of the main variables used in this study. 
 
 
Variable Description  Source 
   Contractual mechanisms       
   MACs contractual mechanisms       
MAC  Material-Adverse-Change clause for Target  SEC filings 
MAE Material-Adverse-Event  SEC  filings 
MAE exclusions  Number of MAE exclusions in MAC  SEC filings 
Walk-away right for acquirer  
    (MACs in merger agreement) 
Dummy  for "Acquirer can terminate the acquisition 
in case of a MAE".  
1=Yes, 0=No
SEC filings 
MAE exclusions  Number of MAE exclusions  SEC filings 
Market-Wide MAE exclusions  Number of Market-Wide exclusions  SEC filings 
Firm-Specific MAE exclusions  Number of Firm-Specific MAE exclusions  SEC filings 
Above-median # MAE exclusions  Dummy for "Above-median # MAE exclusions". 
1=Yes, 0=No 
SEC filings 
Structure of MACs known at  
Announcement Date? ("sametime") 
Binary variable. 1= merger agreement is filed at the 
same time the acquisition is announced.  0 = merger 
agreement is filed  after the announcement date.  
SEC filings, Factiva 
Characteristics of the Takeover processes 
Due diligence by Acquirer  Dummy for the due diligence conducted by the 
acquirer according to what is reported in the 
"background of the merger" section in the merger 
agreement. 1=Yes, 0=No 
SEC filings 
Log(Days Due Diligence by Acquirer)  log of the days of due diligence conducted by the 
acquirer according to what is reported in the 
"background of the merger" section in the merger 
agreement. 1=Yes, 0=No 
SEC filings 
Arb-spreads  Following Mitchell and Pulvino (2001), the arbitrage 
spread is defined to be the offer price minus the target 
price divided by the target price. 
CRSP, SEC filings,  
Factiva, SDC,  
LivEdgar M&A database 
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   Transaction attributes       
Premium offered  Offer premium compared to target's stock price 4 
weeks before the announcement date 
SEC file,  SDC,  
LivEdgar M&A database,  
 (Check prices with CRSP)   
Auction  Binary variable. 1= Target mentions a formal auction 
process to sell the company. This process includes 
contacting many bidders and requesting bids 




Hostile/Unsolicited  Binary variable. 1= Acquirer submits a hostile or 
unsolicited bid to the acquirer. 
SEC filings, SDC, Factiva 
 
Challenging  Binary variable. 1= Acquirer submits or starts an 
takeover process after a previous acquisition has 
already been announced or is in process. 
SEC filings, Factiva, SDC, LivEdgar 
M&A database 
 
Completed acquisition  Binary variable. 1= Acquisition is completed.  SEC filings, SDC, Factiva 
Terminated acquisition  Binary variable. 1= Acquisition is terminated.  SEC filings, SDC, Factiva 
Renegotiated acquisition  Binary variable. 1= Acquisition is renegotiated. A, 
acquisition is renegotiated if the original terms of the 
acquisition change after the first announcement date.  
In some cases, the price does not change, but only the 
method of payment changes.  Acquisitions in which 
changes in exchange ratios occur within the 
negotiated range of an original collar provision are 
not labeled as renegotiated. 
SEC filings, Factiva, 
LivEdgar M&A database 
 
Cash-only payment  Offered price is 100% in cash  SEC filings,  SDC,  
LivEdgar M&A database   
   Characteristics of the target and the acquirer       
Log(MV Assets Target)  Log of market value of Target's assets 
Compustat data: Market Value of Assets =  
(book_value_assets -book_common_equity - 
Common Shares Outstanding*Price -- Fiscal Year -- 
Close) =  data6 - data60 + data25*data199 
Compustat 
 
Log(MV Assets Acquirer)  Log of market value of Acquirer’s assets 




Relative Size (MV Assets)  MVAssets Target / MVAssets Acquirer  Compustat 
Diversified Acquisition  Different Industry, using all SIC4   SDC, Compustat 
s.dev. TrgRet prior yr  Standard deviation of Target's stock return in year 






Time Profile and Description of Material-Adverse-Events (MAE) exclusions 
The sample includes 844 acquisitions of US public targets announced by US public acquirers between 
1998 and 2005.  Material adverse change (MAC) clauses are obtained directly from the merger 
agreements filed with the SEC.  These merger agreements also describe the number and type of material-
adverse-event (MAE) exclusions contained in the MAC clause.  Panel A reports the frequency of MACs 
and the average number of MAE exclusions in each sample year.  Panel B reports the percentage of 
sample firms with each type of MAE exclusion. 
 
Panel A: Time Profile 
 MACs  MAE  Exclusions 
Year  # of acquisitions  % with MAC Mean  % > 0 
1998 183  89.1%  2.4 52.5% 
1999 184  88.6%  2.4 54.3% 
2000 133  91.0%  3.5 68.4% 
2001 105  92.4%  4.2 80.0% 
2002 48  97.9%  5.1  85.4% 
2003 65  95.4%  5.0  87.7% 
2004 74  95.9%  5.8  87.8% 
2005 52 90.4% 6.5 88.5% 
Total 844  91.4% 3.7 68.7% 
 






Any economic condition  54%  Changes due to agreement or transaction  50% 
Target industry conditions  51%  “Disproportionate” economic condition.  33% 
Change in law or regulation  26%  Stock price  17% 
Change in accounting  25%  Miscellaneous  14% 
Any capital market condition  22%  Loss of customers, suppliers, employees  10% 
War/terrorism  9%  Failure to meet projections  7% 
    Litigation/breach of fiduciary duty  5% 




Sample Description and Univariate Comparison 
Descriptive statistics for the sample of 844 announced acquisitions of US public targets by US public 
acquirers between 1998 and 2005.  Appendix II contains definitions and data sources for all variables.  
For each characteristic, we report the mean value for the full sample as well as for subsamples with 
above-median and below-median number of material adverse event (MAE) exclusions.  ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, of the difference between the average 











Acquirer market capitalization ($millions) $10,199  $12,426  $6,798  *** 
Target market capitalization ($millions)  $1,437  $1,580  $1,219   
Relative size (target mkt cap./acquirer mkt.cap.)  0.33  0.27  0.43  *** 
Percentage of ‘hostile’ bids 10.7%  2.0%  24.0%  *** 
Percentage of tender offers  20.7%  12.0%  34.1%  *** 
Percentage of ‘diversified deal’ bids  21.9%  25.4%  19.6%  *** 
Percentage of ‘cash-only’ bids 30.5%  27.0%  35.6%  *** 
Percentage of ‘stock-only’ bids  48.0%  49.0%  46.4%   
Percentage of payment in cash 40.0%  37.4%  44.6%  *** 
Percentage with target termination fees  79.6%  87.8%  67.1%  *** 
Percentage with acquirer termination fees  25.2%  29.6%  18.6%  *** 
Percentage with lockup agreement  21.4%  21.6%  21.3%   




Post-Announcement Acquisition Dynamics 
Panel A reports the frequency distribution of acquisition outcomes.  Panel B reports the frequency of 
material adverse events (MAEs) and the link between MAEs and acquisition outcomes.  Panel C reports 
the magnitude of the revision in offer price for the subset of acquisitions whose terms are renegotiated 
following a MAE.  Data are obtained are obtained from news and proxy files found in LivEdgar M&A 
database, 10kWizard, and Factiva News.  Some acquisitions can be classified as having been renegotiated 
and terminated due to a MAE.  The sample includes 844 announced acquisitions of US public targets by 
US public acquirers between 1998 and 2005. 
Panel A: Frequency Distribution of Outcomes    
 Number  % of sample 
Acquisition is completed  737  87.3% 
Acquisition is terminated  107  12.7% 
Terms of acquisition are renegotiated  92  10.9% 
          Terms renegotiated – acquisition completed  65  7.7% 
          Terms renegotiated – acquisition terminated  27  3.2% 
 
Panel B: Link Between Material Adverse Events and Acquisition Outcomes 
  Number  % of sample 
Acquisitions with MAE  89  10.5% 
Terms  renegotiated due to MAE  50  5.9% 
          Terms renegotiated – acquisition completed  39  4.6% 
          Terms renegotiated – acquisition terminated  11  1.3% 
Acquisition terminated due to MAE  50  5.9% 
Acquisition terminated following earlier renegotiation of terms due 
to MAE 
16 1.9% 
Panel C: Price renegotiations due to Material Adverse Events    
  
Number 
Mean % change 
in offer price 
Market-wide MAE reducing value of target  22  -7.6% 
Firm-specific MAE reducing value of target  44  -14.8% 
Market-wide MAE on acquirer  1  0.0% 




Association between MAC Structure and probability of completion and renegotiation. 
Estimates from logit models of the probability of completion or renegotiation. Estimated coefficients from 
the logit are transformed to report the standardized odds-ratio [i.e., exp(b*SD of X) = change in odds for 
SD increase in X]. An odds-ratio larger than one denotes a positive relation between the independent and 
the dependent variables (i.e., an increase in the predicted probability). An odds-ratio smaller than one 
denotes a negative relation between the independent and the dependent variables (i.e., a decrease in the 
predicted probability). The marginal effects report the change in the probability for an infinitesimal 
change in each continuous independent variable and the discrete change in the probability for dummy 
independent variables.  All logit models include year-dummy variables and intercepts but these 
coefficients are not reported in the tables.  Logit regressions use Eicker-Huber-White-Sandwich 
heteroskedastic-robust standard errors clustered by industry. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. The initial sample consists of 844 announced acquisitions of US public 
targets and US public acquirers between 1998 and 2005. Appendix II contains variable definitions and 
data sources.  
Logit on Prob[Completion=1]  Logit on Prob[Renegotiation=1] 




std odds ratio 
/(p) Marginal  Effects 
# of MAE exclusions  2.176 *** [0.013] -0.191  ***  [-0.014]
(0.000)      (0.000)      
Renegotiated deal  0.942      [-0.011]                           
(0.592)                                
Termination fee by Target  1.890 *** [0.087] 0.033       [0.002]
(0.000)      (0.919)      
Only Cash Payment  0.886      [-0.014] -0.103       [-0.007]
(0.255)      (0.770)      
Challenging 0.822 *      [-0.054] 1.969  ***  [0.141]
(0.063)      (0.000)      
Log(MV Assets Target)  0.947      [-0.002] 0.084       [0.006]
(0.750)      (0.313)      
Relative Size   0.510 *** [-0.053] 0.149       [0.011]
    (MV Assets)  (0.006)      (0.221)      
Hostile/Unsolicited 0.868 *      [-0.040] 2.212  ***  [0.158]
(0.096)      (0.000)      
Auction 1.893 *** [0.080] -0.345  *      [-0.025]
0.000       (0.057)      
Dummy Year Variables  Yes Yes 
McFadden's Adj R
2  0.323       0.197       
Prob > Likelihood Ratio:  0.000       0.000       





MAC Structure and Arbitrage Spreads 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics and univariate comparison of arbitrage spreads on Day 1 and Day 20 relative to the 
acquisition announcement for the full sample and for subsamples with below median and above median number of MAE 
exclusions.  Arbitrage spreads are defined as the percentage difference between the offer price and the stock price of the target on 
that day. Appendix II contains the definition and data sources for the remaining variables.  ***, **, * denote significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  Panel B presents two sets of three regressions of arbitrage spreads on the number of MAE 
exclusions and a series of control variables.  In models (1)-(3), the dependent variable is the arbitrage spread on Day 1, while in 
models (4)-(6), the dependent variable is the arbitrage spread on Day 20.  Coefficient estimates are reported with p-values in 
parentheses below.  P-values are estimated using Eicker-Huber-White-Sandwich heteroskedastic-robust standard errors clustered 
by target industry.  The initial sample consists of 844 announced acquisitions of US public targets by US public acquirers 
between 1998 and 2005.   







Median Arbitrage Spread on Day 1   6.2%  8.5%  5.2%  *** 
         
Median Arbitrage Spread on Day 20   4.2%  7.4%  3.1%  *** 
Panel B. Cross-Sectional Regressions of Arbitrage Spreads  
(1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Day 1  Day 1  Day 1  Day 20  Day 20  Day 20 
MAE  exclusions  -0.482 -0.917 -0.176  -1.005  -1.483  0.800 
  (0.071) (0.037) (0.329)  (0.117) (0.098)  (0.288) 
Termination fee by Target  -3.442  -3.314  -3.308  -18.137  -22.505  -9.427 
  (0.353) (0.678) (0.217)  (0.341) (0.386)  (0.056) 
Only-Cash  Payment  -3.603 -1.644 -5.075  6.608  8.958  -6.861 
  (0.118) (0.707) (0.086)  (0.563) (0.491)  (0.427) 
Challenging  6.312 2.038 7.571  -1.853  -6.597  2.309 
  (0.128) (0.799) (0.112)  (0.801) (0.510)  (0.816) 
Log(MV Assets Target)  -0.414  -0.086 -0.671  -0.476  0.640  -5.354 
  (0.487) (0.903) (0.481)  (0.479) (0.453)  (0.053) 
Relative Size   2.531  2.854  1.742  3.522  2.610  9.179 
    (MV Assets)  (0.079)  (0.153) (0.305)  (0.309)  (0.517)  (0.100) 
Hostile/Unsolicited  6.047 0.755 9.586  -9.450 -19.628 16.172 
  (0.153) (0.915) (0.075)  (0.504) (0.335)  (0.079) 
Auction  3.367 1.584 4.886  -0.150  -1.339  5.502 
  (0.121) (0.774) (0.082)  (0.977) (0.833)  (0.506) 
Intercept  17.582 17.382 17.916 33.327 32.809  46.200 
  (0.005) (0.088) (0.020)  (0.105) (0.232)  (0.020) 
           
R
2  0.020  0.023  0.030  0.011  0.013  0.123 
N  811  343  468  811  667  144 




MAC Structure and Offer Premiums 
Cross-sectional regressions of the offer premium on the number of MAE exclusions and a series of control variables.  Models (1) 
and (2) report estimates from OLS regressions.  Models (3) and (4) report estimates from a three stage least squares (3SLS) 
model using a simultaneous estimation process.  Coefficient estimates are reported with p-values in parentheses below.  P-values 
in the OLS regressions are measured using Eicker-Huber-White-Sandwich heteroskedastic-robust standard errors clustered by 
target industry. The initial sample includes 844 announced acquisitions of US targets by US acquirers between 1998 and 2005.  













# MAE exclusions 
(4) 
MAE exclusions+  -0.011  ***  -0.012  ***  -0.047  *                             
 (+ instrumented in 3SLS)  (0.005)       (0.003)       (0.060)                                
Offer premium                                                                           2.582      
                                                                           (0.135)      
Log(MVAssets-target)  -0.055 ***  -0.046 ***  -0.04 ***  0.338 **   
(0.001)       (0.003)       (0.004)       (0.034)      
Log(MVAssets  -acquirer)  0.039 **    0.035 **    0.041 ***  0.115        
(0.015)       (0.017)       (0.000)       (0.260)      
Log(Tobins-q-target)  -0.03       -0.027       -0.022       0.376  *   
(0.344)       (0.399)       (0.417)       (0.058)      
Std.dev. of target return in prior 
year  0.036  ***  0.037  ***  0.04  ***                           
(0.001)       (0.001)       (0.000)                                
Only-cash payment                            0.072  **   0.077  **   0.013      
                          (0.036)       (0.021)       (0.961)      
Hostile/Unsolicited                            -0.047       -0.142       -2.025  *** 
                          (0.480)       (0.116)       (0.000)      
Challenging                                     0.045       0.067                                
                          (0.500)       (0.408)                                
Termination fee by target                            0.003       0.051                                
                          (0.888)       (0.297)                                
Log(Days Due Diligence                                                                           0.499  *** 
   by Acquirer)                                                                          (0.000)      
Diversified deal                                                                          -0.611  **  
                                                                        (0.027)      
Intercept  0.39 ***  0.342 ***  0.333 ***  -1.541        
(0.000)       (0.001)       (0.000)       (0.222)      
Adjusted R
2           0.086       0.087       0.083       0.182      




Figure 1. Timeline of the Takeover process 
The announcement date divides the takeover process in the pre-announcement and the post-announcement takeover processes. Acquirers and targets report specific information 
about the pre-announcement takeover process in the SEC filings after the announcement date.  Brackets, such as the one for the Due-Diligence, represent windows with large 
variation for each acquisition. 
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Figure 2. The structure of MACs and the predicted probability of Completion 
Figure 2 presents the predicted probabilities of completion and based on the Logit model 2 in Panel A of Table V.  Dotted lines 
depict the 95% confidence intervals.  The baseline probability of termination is 0.87.  Sample starts with 844 announced 
acquisitions of US public targets and US public acquirers (1998 to 2005) 
 
 
Figure 3. The structure of MACs and the predicted probability of Renegotiation 
Figure 3 presents the predicted probabilities of renegotiation based on the Logit model 2 in Panel A of Table VI.  Dotted lines 
depict the 95% confidence intervals.  The baseline probability of renegotiation is 0.11.  Sample starts with 844 announced 











0123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3
Upper Conf. Int. 95% 94.8 95.4 96.1 96.8 97.5 98.1 98.6 99.1 99.4 99.6 99.8 99.9 100. 100.
Mean (%) 90.0 91.8 93.4 94.6 95.6 96.5 97.2 97.7 98.2 98.5 98.8 99.0 99.2 99.4









































0123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3
Upper Conf. Int. 95% 16.2 13.3 11.0 9.1 7.6 6.4 5.5 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1
Mean (%) 11.2 9.5 8.0 6.7 5.7 4.8 4.0 3.3 2.8 2.3 1.9 1.6 1.3 1.1
Lower Conf. Int. 95% 6.2 5.7 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.1 2.5 1.9 1.4 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.2
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Number of MAE exclusions: 